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The Infliction of Emotional Distress as an Independent Tort: The Necessity of
Physical Injury-McDowell v. Davis, 33 N.C. App. 529, 235 S.E. 2d 896 (1977)
INTRODUCTION
In an action brought against the Durham County Sheriff, (two deputies and
an insurance company were also named as co-defendants) the plaintiffs, James
and Mary McDowell, sought to recover for mental distress without any evidence
of physical injury or physical consequences. ' The plaintiffs, tenants of the Durham Housing Authority (DHA),2 sued the defendants in their individual and
official capacity. 3 The plaintiffs, being in arrears for the payment of rent, became
subject to an ejectment order that was served on them on June 20, 19744. The
DHA decided to delay execution on the judgment through a condition that the
plaintiffs pay $50 per week until all of the unpaid rent was satisfied. 5 The Dur6
ham County Sheriff was given personal notice not to execute the judgment.
After a misunderstanding with the DHA, the Deputy Sheriff was told to execute
the judgment. 7 The Deputy performed exactly as he had been instructed, and removed the plaintiffs' belongings from the housing unit. 8 The plaintiffs accused
the defendants of gross negligence in the performance of their duties, and
claimed the ejectment to be unduly insensitive, causing them "shame, humiliation, and mental anguish." 9 From a judgment allowing no recovery, the plaintiffs appealed. 10 The Court of Appeals, in affirming, found the trial court to be
free of prejudicial error.''
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPACT RULE

The common law was hesitant to regard mental distress resulting from a
negligent act as a violation of a protected interest.' 2 The common law's reluctance to remedy the emotional distress caused by fright or shock was supported
primarily by the incomplete medical knowledge of the times. 13 A standard
known as the impact rule evolved in the leading case of Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas.14 The impact rule can simply be stated as the "proposition
that there can be no recovery for physical results of mental anguish without
1. 33 N.C. App. 529, 530, 235 S.E.2d 896, 897 (1977).
2. Id. at 529, 235 S.E.2d at 896.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 530, 235 S.E.2d at 897.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.at 533, 235 S.E.2d at 899.
1I. Id. at 537, 235 S.E.2d at 901.
12. Lynch v. Knight, II Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (H.L. 1861).
13. Note, Torts-Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress-Maine and Michigan Abolish the
"Impact Rule", 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 1029, 1033-35 (1971).
14. 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. Canada 1888).
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impact."' 5 The Couhas decision, being criticized and eroded somewhat by
subsequent cases, was overruled in England only thirteen years later by Dulien v.
White and Sons, 16 where the court gave the plaintiff a recovery for fright caused
plaintiff to suffer an illness and to give premature birth to an idiot child.
The court stated: "That fright-where physical injury is directly produced by
it-cannot be a ground of action merely because of the absence of any accompanying impact appears to me to be a contention both unreasonable and contrary to the weight of authority."' 7
The American courts wrestled with the dichotomy of various formulas to proscribe to the emotional distress cases. The early majority of states required a
contemporaneous physical impact." However, a powerful minority made its
existence known by applying the principles of foreseeability and proximate
cause to ascertain liability for mental distress. 19In any event, the justifications
for the rule were based on the fact that medical science could not clearly show
that the subjective symptoms could not have been caused by the aggravation of
emotional distress. 20 Also, there was a fear of fictitious injuries and fraudulent
claims. 2' Finally, there existed an apprehension that recovery for emotional
distress without an impact would open a pandora's box of undeserving litigants
22
seeking damages that for so long were thought of as unrecoverable.
It is within this setting that McDowell v. Davis23 is to be examined. In Flake v.
Greensboro News Co.,24 the North Carolina courts long ago established the
principle that plain embarrassment or hurt are not recoverable. In that case there
was evidence that through a mistake the picture of the plaintiff dressed in a bathing suit was published in a newspaper advertisement. The picture was supposed
to be one of a member of a vaudeville troupe. The accompanying print indicated
that the person depicted in the picture was to stage a performance in the city.
According to the advertisement, the plaintiff recommended the bread manufactured by one of the defendants for the preservation of a slim figure. She was
described as an "exotic red-haired Venus!1 25 The North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the publication was not libeous per se. In so holding the court
concluded: "The law seeks to compensate for damage to the person, the reputation or the property of an individual. It cannot and does not undertake to com26
pensate for mere hurt or embarrassment alone."
15. Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 10, n. 6, 179 N.W.2d 390, 393 n. 6 (1970).
16. 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
17. Id. at 673-74.
18. See e.g., St. Louis, I. M. and S. R. R.v. Bragg,69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901); Braun v.
Craven, 175 I11.
401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Kalen v. Terre Haute & IRR, 18 Ind. App. 202, 47N.E. 694
(1897).
19. See, e.g., Alabama Fuel and Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176, P. 440 (1918).
20. Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 405, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
21. Id. at 408, 261 A.2d at 87.
22. Id. at 411, 261 A.2d at 89.
23. 33 N.C. App. 529 (1977).
24. 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
25. Id. at 788, 195 S.E. at 58.
26. Id.
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Other North Carolina cases are completely in accord with the holding in the
Flake case. Among these cases are Williamson v. Bennett, 27 and Al/top v. J.C.
Penner Co. 21 The Williamson case involved an action arising out of an automobile collison. The plaintiff, Mrs. Williamson, allegedly suffered physical disability resulting from a supposed vision that she had collied with a child on a
bicycle rather than with another automobile. 29 The plaintiff did not see the
actual contact with her car, but she reportedly heard a "grinding sound on the
left side" of her car. 30 Later on during the same day, the plaintiff became upset. 3i
She eventually visited her own family physician and a psychiatrist at Memorial
Hospital, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 32 The North Carolina Supreme Court,
after addressing the issue of personal injury damages resulting from the defendant's negligence, 33 concluded that the defendant was not operating under any
duty to exercise care against the possibility that the plaintiff might imagine a
situation that did not exist, and that the plaintiff could not recover fora physical
condition of nervousness since she suffered no physical injury.34 The court held
that the accident was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs disturbance and
that the plaintiffs anxiety was not based on anxiety for her own safety; instead
the plaintiffs anxiety was for the safety of a non-existent child on an imaginary
bicycle. 35 On these grounds the court denied recovery. 36 The North Carolina
Supreme Court is, in effect, following the general principle that recovery is most
often disallowed where the upset emotions causing nervousness flow from a concern for the welfare or safety of a person other than the plaintiff.37 Mere fright
which is a product of ordinary negligence is not a sufficient ground to give rise to
a cause of action and is not to be considered as an element of damages. 38 Although the particular significance of this case is directed primarily at situations
involving fright rather than embarrassment, its holding is not to be construed as
applying only to "fright" cases. In order to recover for mental or emotional distress in an ordinary negligence action, the plaintiff must conclusively show that
the mental distress is proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant. 39
Although these N.C. cases give an indication that compliance with the rule
(permitting recovery for physical harm resulting from emotional disturbance) is
a difficult task, recovery is readily allowed where the harm goes beyond one's
feelings to affect the personal mental tranquility in a manner that produces
physical consequences.40 In Crews v. Provident Finance Co. 4 1 the rule allowing
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
10 N.C. App. 692, 179 S.E.2d 885 (1971), cert. denied, 279 N.C. 348, 182 S.E.2d 580 (1971).
251 N.C. at 498, 112 S.E.2d at 48.
251 N.C. at 500, 112 S.E.2d at 49.
Id.
Id.
251 N.C. at 503, 112 S.E.2d at 51-52.
Id. at 507, 112 S.E.2d at 55.
Id.
Id.
Hinnant v. Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
Kirby v. Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 812, 1,88
S.E. 625, 627 (1936).
Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498 at 507-08.
Crews v. Provident Finance Co., 271 N.C. 684, 689, 157 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1967).
Id.
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recovery was met where the defendant collecting agent, knowing of plaintiffs
heart condition and high blood pressure, continued to threaten the plaintiff that
he would have her arrested even though he was well aware of the fact that she had
paid in full the prior claim of forty-five dollars. The defendant's use of abusive
language incited so much anger within the plaintiff that she suffered a heart
attack while preparing dinner that evening.4 2 The court held that anger causing
an acute angina condition and increased blood pressure would satisfy the requirements as an "emotional disturbance." 43 In particular, the court noted that
the "physical injury" requirement does not demand that the injury be visible; it is
sufficient that the physical consequences of the disturbance have an adverse
effect on the normal bodily functions."a The Restatement of Torts substantiates
the court's application of "physical injury." 45 The criterion for recovery therefore becomes one of attaching physical ramifications to the emotional annoyances. An action based solely on mental suffering will not stand in a court of
law.

46

In closely tracing the historical development of the impact rule and in examining the reaction of modern courts to isolated applications of the rule, it is not uncommon to locate ordinary fact situations that nevertheless provide for a substantive alteration of the rule by the court systems. 47 The early decisions that
applied the rule allowed recovery only if awarded as "parasitic" damages made
concomitant to an award on an independent substantive cause of action. 48 A
slow but gradual weakening of the arbitrary barriers to recovery became apparent with the establishment of various exceptions to the rule whenever there was
42. Id. at 686, 157 S.E.2d at 383.
43. I. at 690, 157 S.E.2d at 386.
44. Id.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §436 (1965):

(1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care designed to protect
another from a fright or other emotional disturbance which the actor should recognize as
involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that the harm results solely
through the internal operation of the fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily
harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and
immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely from the internal
operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
46. Petition of United States, 303 F.Supp. 1282, 1324 (E.D.N.C. 1969).
47. One illuminating example is First National Bank v. Langley, 314 So.2d 324 (Miss. 1975)
where the plaintiff asserted a cause of action against a bank for damages allegedly sustained by the
bank's negligence in losing a deposit. The Mississippi court held that the total absence of physical
impact on the plaintiffdoes not serve to automatically preclude an award of damages for emotional
disturbance where the adverse reaction is reasonably foreseeable on the part of the defendant. The
court added that loss of earnings and earning capacity were recoverable, but that punitive damages
were not.
48. See Lynch v. Knight, supra note 12, where Lord Wensleydale elaborately expressed the
court's decision when he stated: "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value and does not pretend
to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone."
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even the slightest impact, 49 or whenever the emotional disturbance occurred
before the impact, 50 or whenever the infliction of the emotional disturbance was
done in a willful, wanton or grossly negligent way. 51 These exceptions which
provide an "end run" around the impact requirement explicitly illustrate that
bodily impact is not a prerequisite to insure the genuineness of the alleged injuries. 52 Some jurisdictions ultimately rejected the impact rule in deference to a
limitation that liability would be conditioned on the proximity of the plaintiff to
the physical risk. 53 But even a repudiation of this "zone of danger" doctrine can
be found in Dillon v. Legg54 where the court's rationale for allowing recovery
turned on the foreseeability of the injury. 55 Yet Dillon is not to be read too
broadly. The requirements of assuredly exigent circumstances coupled with the
medical proof as a guarantee of the validity of the injury are indeed ever present;
nevertheless, recovery is without doubt restricted to negligently inflicted emo56
tional disturbances that are characterized by some type of physical injury.
However, the Restatement of Torts (Second)takes an even broader view. In one
section the Restatement recognizes a valid right to recover only when the emotional distress produces physical injury.5 7 Paradoxically, the Restatement (Second) also provides for a recovery if the defendant should realize that the emotional disturbance resulting from his negligence involves an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm. 58 It would seem appropriate to conclude that the Restatement
(Second) has laid the theoretical foundation for the emergence of mental tranquility as deserving independent protection under general tort principles.5 9 In
First National Bank v. Langley, the court implicitly created a necessary safeguard against infinite liability by making the recovery conditional on the de49. E.g. Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke); Porter v.

Delaware, L. and W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in eye).
50. E.g. Mitlik v. Whalen Bros. Inc., 115 Conn. 650, 163 A. 414(1932) (automobile collison caus-

ing fear).
51. Delta Finance Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956) (intimidation of a
child); Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So.2d 154 (1963) (harsh and abusive language).

52. The advances of medical technology and psychiatry contributed to the fact that a genuine
medical injury did not require a physical impact. See Amdursky, The Interest in Mental Tranquility,
13 BUFFALO L. REV. 339 (1963); Smith. Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liabilit'
.for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193 at 212-26 (1944).
53. See Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401,
261 A.2d 84 (1970); Comment, Negligence-Infliction of Emotional Harm-A Suggested Analysis,
54 IOWA L. REV. 914 (1964); 43 TEMP. L.Q. 59 (1969).

54. 68 Cal.2d 728. 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). The court was faced with the task of
justifying its rationale when placed in a dilemma of sorts. The court had to reason through a mode of
analysis that would ordinarily givea recovery to the sister of the deceased, who was within the zone
of danger, while denying it to the mother, who was only a few yards away, but outside of the danger
zone.

55. By eliminating artificial obstacles to the plaintiff's claim, he is then allowed to present

evidence; it does not show that the plaintiff will win a recovery. See Comment, I FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
670 (1973).
56. See 16 VILL. L. REV. 10 11, 1014(1971); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d
117. 118 (Me. 1970).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 436A, 312, Comment a at 110 (1965).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (I).

59. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Rodriquez v. State, 52 Haw.
156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); See also PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 53-53 (4th ed. 1971); Green, The

Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1019-28 (1928).
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fendant creating a foreseeable and also unreasonable risk of extreme mental
harm to an average person, notwithstanding his position to any arbitrarily
established danger zone. 6° One can only hazard a guess as to whether courts will
seek to retain the aura of the Langley decision; nevertheless, to prohibit a plaintiff from producing evidence of valid emotional harm would do little more than
extend the arbitrariness that the renunciation of the impact rule has attacked. 6'
Closely related to the allegations of the instant case are remarks spoken to
others or acts done in the presence of others which result in petty insult and indignity. Our present society places moderate demands upon its citizens (all
plaintiffs included) to withstand a certain degree of insensitive language, as well
as rude and inconsiderate acts. 62 Historically, the common law was unquestionably hesitant to recognize the personal interest of mental tranquility as deserving of legal protection, even as to invasions that were intentional. 63 An
argument can be made for a broad principle that would make the deliberate infliction of mental distress actionable, placing the burden of establishing a defense (i.e. privilege) on the defendant. 64 On the other side of the coin lies the
ubiquitous protection afforded by the first amendment to the United States
Constitution. 65 One obvious but perplexing question demands a focus in order
to realign the perspective of protection given by tort principles. Between the extremes of utter outrage and petty annoyances, where must the line be drawn so
that liability will be attached? The courts, in answering the question, have made
their task less difficult than it otherwise would have been. The threshold of ex66
treme outrage marks the beginning of the line; the courts have drawn it there.
In Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corporation,67 a patron of the hotel cocktail
lounge was insulted by the words of a waiter who, after being paid with a twenty
60. 314 So.2d at 339. See also PROSSER, Note 59supra,§ 54; I FLA. ST.U.L. RF. supra note 55at

682.
61. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Caseforan Independent Tort, 59 GEO.
L.J. 1237 (1971).
62. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 44 (1956).
63. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance of the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033,

1035 (1936).
64. Id. at 1035. Notice that such a principle has been rejected on policy reasons.
Adoption of the suggested principle would open up a wide vista of litigation in the field
of bad manners, where relatively minor annoyances had better be dealt with by instruments of social control other than the law. Quite apart from the question how for peace of

mind is a good thing in itself, it would be a quixotic indeed for the law to attempt a general
security of it. Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the
mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be.
65. See Prosser, note 62, supra, at p. 44.

66. Id. at p. 45.
67. 49 A.2d 81, 83 (Mun. App. D.C. 1946). The court noted that consideration should be given to
the severity of the defendant's conduct and the amount of injury suffered as those factors are related
to the existence of the cause of action. The cause of action itself and the extent of recovery are
dependent on the amount of damage suffered. If a cause of action for insult arises only when the
insult goes beyond triviality so that the insult produces harm of significant nature, then the jury

must be guided by a standard in order to decide if a right of recovery indeed exists. Such a guideline
for the jury would aid in ascertaining the limits of decency and in so doing would inherently create
the requirements necessary to distinguish the serious from the trivial.
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dollar bill, gave the patron change for a ten dollar bill and then stated, "We have
had people try this before." An order dismissing the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action was affirmed. The court there relied on several noteworthy
authorities who expressed difficulty in determining a standard for distinguishing
between trivial and serious indignities. Professor Magruder, writing in the
Harvard Law Review, prefers extended liability through the use of broad principles enunciated within the following formula: "That one who, without just
cause or excuse, and beyond all the bounds of decency, purposely causes a disturbance of another's mental and emotional tranquility of so acute a nature that
harmful physical consequences might be not unlikely to result, is subject to
liability in damages for such mental and emotional disturbance even though no
demonstrable physical consequences actually enure." 69 Magruder himself
warns of dangers in placing conduct within the mentioned categories. Moreover, he furnishes no test for differentiating the serious from the trivial.7"
In its summary argument the court in Wallace v. Shorehamn Hotel Corporation relied heavily upon a quotation found in Clark v. Associated Retail Credit
Men, where the court stated in its initial focus on liability for mental distress in
the absence of physical injury:
The law does not, and doubtless should not, impose a general duty of
care to avoid causing mental distress. For the sake of reasonable freedom of action, in our own interest and that of society, we need the
privilege of being careless whether we inflict mental distress on our
neighbors. It is perhaps less clear that we need the privilege of distressing them intentionally and without excuse. Yet there is, and probably
should be, no principle that mental distress purposely caused is
actionable unless justified. Such a principle would raise awkward questions of de minimis and of excuse. 7 3
In short, there is at least one standard of which we can be certain. That standard simply defines the duty of the court to decide if the conduct is extreme (as the
court did in Wallace v. Shoreharn Hotel Corporation) 4 and whether the distress
is serious and reasonable. Where reasonable men would differ, thejury decides if
the conduct is extreme and if the emotional distress is serious. The jury's function here is executed under the direction of instructions directing their focus on
the question of degree.7 5
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

i. at 81.
hi. at 82.
Id.
k/. at 81.
70 App. D.C. 183, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
I. at 64.
See note 67 supra.
See Prosser, note 62 supra, at p. 45, note 25.
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OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIT OF

42 USC § 198376

In the instant case the petitioners base a major claim upon an alleged constitutional violation of their fourth amendement right "to be secure in their per77
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
Attached to this claim is petitioner's claim for compensation for the humiliation
78
caused by the violation, regardless of a specific showing of property damage.
The Court of Appeals, in holding for the defendants, relied upon the validity of
the judicial order and thus stated:
A violation of such an unofficial and informal agreement or policy as
shown here between the sheriff and the holder of an ejectmentjudgment
is at most a breach of the defendants' duties to exercise ordinary care,
and does not divest the defendants of their authority to execute a valid
79
judicial order.
Such authority and its ramifications lend itself to a critique of the immunity
applications contained within 42 USC § 1983. This civil rights legislation presents different degrees of immunity, one of which is applicable to the instant
case.""
The wording of 42 USC § 1983 places two demands upon the plaintiff seeking
recovery. The plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant has deprived the
plaintiff of a protected right, secured by the provisions of the United States
Constitution or by statutory law."' The second requirement is that the plaintiff
must show that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional right
"under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
82
State or Territory."
A landmark case involving significant interpretation of 42 USC § 1983 is
Monroe v. Pape.83 The plaintiffs in Monroe alleged that the defendants,
(police officers) acting completely in the absence of a warrant in violation of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution, broke into their home
one morning, rousted them from bed, ransacked the house and arrested one of
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
77. 33 N.C. App. at 533.
78. ki.
79. k/. at 536.
80. E.g. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). The Strickland standard is one of qualified
immunity-such a standard does not impose absolute immunity; the standard allows a defendant to
demonstrate immunity by showing that he was reasonable in not knowing that his actions constituted a derogation of another's constitutionally protected rights. 420 U.S. at 322; Schuer v.
Rhodes. 416 U.S. 232, 247-49 (1974). Immunity is upheld if the conduct was, in light of all the circumstances. reasonable and in good faith.
81. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, at 150 (1970).
82. /i.

83. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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them. 84 The defendants argued that they could not be reached by section 1983,
contending that their conduct violated no Illinois law and therefore, they could
not have acted with a valid claim under color of that state's laws. 85 The argument
continues that unless the conduct is done under color of state law, the defendants
are not consitutionally liable under the statute.8 6 The Court refused to acquiesce
in this interpretation of section 1983, noting that the statute was enacted to give
individuals a federal remedy "where the state remedy, though adequate in
theory, was not available in practice. 87T A hearing of the plaintiffs' federal
claims was approved by the high court even though the defendants' conduct
constituted a violation state law thereby providing for a state remedy.8 8 The
Court construed the word "wilfully," which was missing in section 1983,89 to
reflect the broad background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for
the natural consequences of his actions, 90 and that there should be no requirement placed upon the plaintiffs to show that the defendants intended to cause a
constitutional invasion. 91
The holding in Monroe is not altogether singular but has dual ramifications.
The case did indeed establish the principle that those whose constitutional rights
are deprived by a state officer's "misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law
and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
the state" can recover damages in federal courts. 92 Of equal significance is the
additional holding that Congress did not attempt or desire to draw municipal
corporations within the scope of section 1983. 93 This holding was accomplished
by examining the legislative history of section 1983 and by carefully construing
the word "persons" so that municipalities would not be considered putatively.
liable under the section for unconstitutional conduct. 94 The second portion of
the Monroe holding disturbs the various policy reasons favoring municipal liability. First of all, it is at times extraordinarily difficult to identify the individual
84. Id. at 169.
85. Id. at 172. The defendant's argument was put to rest in Home Tel. and Tel. Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913) where the Court held that a federal court had the authority to enjoin
unconstitutional actions by state officers even when the state did not authorize the actions.
86. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
87. 365 U.S. at 174.
88. Id. at 183.
89. Id. at 187.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, at 326(1941). One extreme exception allows for conduct by the officers that is in the "ambit of their personal pursuits," Screws v. U.S.,
325 U.S. 91, 11l(1945), but the limitation is obviously restricted to situations where the state officer
is acting as a private citizen. See e.g., Perkins v. Rich, 204 F.Supp. 98 (D. Del. 1962), affd, 316 F.2d
236 (3d Cir. 1963) (a police officer in signing a complaint against one who had placed an obscene call
to his house, was not acting under color of state law because the act of signing the complaint was not
limited to the police officials-anyone similarly harmed could have done likewise).
93. 365 U.S. at 187.
94. Id. at 190-191. See e.g., City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) ("Person" does not
include municipalities); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) ("Person" does not include
counties). But see Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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officials who have committed the violation. 95 Also, individual officials do not
have the financial ability to satisfy large judgments. 96 Furthermore, even when
the jury is persuaded that the plaintiff has been deprived of his constitutional
rights, they nevertheless are hesitant to allow a recovery against an official who
undergoes litigation for doing what he thought his job required. 97 At any rate,
Monroe has withstood these challenges as well as one based on the readings of
the legislative history. 98 In fact, some of the lower federal courts tried to restrict
Monroe by holding that municipalities were vulnerable to attacks where there
was no immunity provided under state law, 99 or where the claim for relief was
equitable in nature.100 The U.S. Supreme Court nevertheless struck down these
federal cases and reinforced Monroe's interpretation of the statute in two 1973
decisions. 101 These decisions demonstrate the absence of congressional intent
to perpetrate statutory liability on municipalities via section 1983. However,
these same cases do not show that the Supreme Court would restrain the federal
02
courts in awarding damages arising under the fourteenth amendment.
Although most state officials are endowed with personal immunity that defeats recovery against them individually, 03 the 1983 immunity is by no means
absolute, 04 and it even becomes "qualified" when objective guidelines are con5
sidered in the evaluation of the circumstances. 10
(Of course, absolute immunity
06
10 7
for legislators and judicial officials does remain a solid part of the American
legal process.) The U.S. SupremeCourtdid not entertain the question of official
95. See Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 1265, 1271, 1281-82, 1284, 1286 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975) (Court upheld verdict for 69 defendant police officers partially on the
theory that plaintiff shouldered the burden of showing which defendant had fired the lethal shots).
96. Seee.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966). "Neither the personal assets
of policemen nor the nominal bonds they furnish afford genuine hope of redress."
97. See e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,421-22
(1971).
98. See e.g., Kates and Kouba, Liabilityof Public Entities Under Section 1983 ofthe Civil Rights
Act, 45 S.CAL. L. REV. 131, 132-45 (1972); Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1205-07 (1971).

99. See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (intent of Congress not to establish municipal immunity but to defer such immunity to that which exists under local law), rev'd on

other grounds sub nora. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Comment, Toward
State and Municipal Liability in Damages for Denial of Racial Equal Protection, 57 CALIF. L. REV.
1142, 1145, 1158 (1969).
100. See Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1961).
101. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, Note 94 Supra, (Section 1983 cannot support an action that seeks
an injunction against the city); Moor v. County of Alameda, note 94 supra (Section 1983 cannot be
used as an alternative ground for recovery in a damage action where a county could be held liable
under state law).
102. Cf Robinson v. Cunlisk, 385 F.Supp. 529,535-36 (N.D. I11.1974) (Moor, notes 101, 94supra,
does not forbid using 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) against municipalities); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378
F.Supp. 913, 916-18 (E.D.Pa. 1974) (same).
103. See Dakin, Municipal Immunity in Police Torts, 16 CLEV-MAR. L. REv. 448, 480 (1967).
104. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 157, 174 (1961); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932)

(The Governor of Texas was refused a grant of absolute immunity by the Supreme Court).
105. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Schuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).

106. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); U.S. CONST. art. I § 6.
107. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
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immunity in section 1983 suits until 1974 when Schuer v.Rhodes I'l was litigated, There the Court reversed a dismissal of a damage claim, brought on behalf of three of the students killed at Kent State University, against the Governor
of Ohio, the University president, and Ohio National Guard officers. In repudiating absolute immunity with respect to executive officers, the Court
adopted a qualified immunity that would serve to reinforce and maintain the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land10 9 while simultaneously operating to
avoid a sapping of 42 USC § 1983 of all its significance. "' The scope of qualified
immunity was depicted as being:
.. .dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the
office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the
time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in
light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.'
In Wood v. Strickland, 12 two high school students were suspended for "spiking" the punch of an extracurricular home economics function. The students
argued that the suspension was in violation of their constitutional right to due
process" 3 and that the punishment was malicious. The students sought reinstatement, an injunction against further sanctions, a declaratory judgment invalidating the school regulation,t14 and compensatory and punitive damages. 115
The suit was filed in federal district court under section 1983 against the school
district, the school board member (in their individual and official capacities) and
the particular administrators enforcing the suspension. A mistrial took place
when the jury could not reach a verdict. A directed verdict was afterwards given
to the defendants. The court's holding declared that the defendants were
immune from liability for damages as long as their actions were conducted in
good faith or without malice,116 and that there existed no evidence from which
108. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
109. I.at 248.
II0. hi.
Ill. i. at 347-48.
112. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
113. Id. at 310.
114, The school regulation provided that "pupils found to be guilty ofany of the following shall be
suspended from school on the first offense for the balance of the semester and such suspension will
be noted on the permanent record of the student along with the reason for suspension.
"(4) The use of intoxicating beverage or possession of same at school or at a school sponsored
activity." W. at 311, n. 3. The members of the school board thought that the compulsory language of
the rule required them to suspend the students for the remainder of the semester. Strickland v. Inlow.
348 F.Supp. 244, 246 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
115. Originally the students sought a preliminary injunction. After a denial of the motion, they
amended the complaint and added the prayer for damages. 420 U.S. at 314, n. 6; Strickland v. Inlow,
485 F.2d 186, 188-189 (8th Cir. 1973).
116. Strickland v. Inlow, 348 F.Supp. 244, 250 (W.D. Ark. 1972). The definition of malice was
given to he "ill will against a person-a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse."
I. at 248.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1978

11

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1978], Art. 7
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LA W JOURNAL
malice could be inferred. 1 7 This particular application of qualified immunity,
based on a defendant's subjective intent, is the one used by most pre-Strickland
decisions in section 1983 suits against school officials." 8 However, the Supreme
Court views that good faith standard as containing both subjective and objective
elements:
In the specific context of school discipline, we hold that a school board
member is not immune from liability for damages under section 1983 if
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional
rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury
to the student." 9
Another application of the Strickland standard, particularly its subjective
quality, overflows into the area of punitive damages. Even though the objective
element permits a discovery of lack of good faith without a showing of subjective
malice, an official act which is adverse to one's constitutional rights can be unreasonable or negligent in the absence of malice. The demands of fairness nonetheless require that any award of punitive damages be grounded on the subjective standard of malicious intent. 120 Malicious intent is, for the most part, primarily established via circumstantial evidence, and it is not extraordinary for an
unreasonable constitutional violation to suffice for the trier of fact to infer
malicious intent.121
CONCLUSION
An application of the facts of the instant case to the established legal doctrine
shows the rationale of the Court of Appeals in making the decision. The independent tort of infliction of emotional distress is subject to defeat in the absence of physical adversity. Modern living demands that petty annoyances go
without legal redress. The traditional impact rule has largely disintegrated into a
question of the foreseeability of injury. Furthermore, with regard to official
immunity, discretionary and objective factors demand use of the concept of
"qualified" immunity. Such a standard reveals a broad policy of forcing those in
public office to account for their own infliction of unconstitutional acts. Public
officials would be wise to become more subjectively alert to their personal behavior in view of the omnipresent United States Constitution.
WAYNE 0.

CLONTZ

117. "The close question, if there is one at all, is whether or not the school policy, as adopted and
maintained, plus the enforcement thereof, created a situation from which malice could be inferred."
The court found that it did not. Id. at 253.
118. Handverger v. Hawill, 479 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied., 414 U.S. 1072 (1973);
Wood v. Goodman, 381 F.Supp. 413 (D. Mass. 1974).
119. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 at 322 (1975).
120. Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920); Stewart v. Nationwide
Check Corp., 279 N.C. 278, 182 S.E.2d 410 (1971).
121. Note 41 and accompanying text supra (School policy and concomitant enforcement insufficient to draw an inference of malice).
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